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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited Liability 
Company, 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent; 
JOHN E. BERRYHILL III, 
Defendant-Cross Respondent; and 
AMY BERRYHILL, 
Defendant. 
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CROSS APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District County of Ada 
The Honorable Dennis E. Goff 
Senior District Judge Presiding at Trial 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
For Respondent-Cross Appellant 
Daniel E. Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
For 
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CROSS APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
Berryhill repeatedly argues the jury could have concluded, notwithstanding the language 
in Berryhill's handwriting, "This is a loan ... " in Exhibit 1, and despite Glenn Mosell having 
written "loan" conspicuously on nine often checks that Berryhill accepted, and regardless of 
Berryhill having accounted for these funds as "loans" to his company, "the parties did not intend 
a loan transaction."l In the same breath, Berryhill is critical of the trial court's conclusion the 
jury found there was no contract, when Berryhill argues the jury could have found a contract 
existed, but then "no breach.,,2 
Having now submitted two briefs, Berryhill fails to identify just what the contract was, if 
it was not for a loan. Then, as even Berryhill is unable to articulate just what the contract was if 
not a loan, how could the jury then have found there was "no breach" of this as yet unidentified 
contract as Berryhill also contends? 
I. BERRYHILL WAIVED APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE ORDER GRANTING NEW 
TRIAL. 
Judge Goff granted Mosell Equities' Motion for New Trial, the review of which involves 
an abuse of discretion standard. Craig Johnson v. Floyd Town Architects, 142 Idaho 797, 800, 
134 P.3d 648,651, (2006). "Decisions within the discretion of the trial court will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of clear and manifest abuse of discretion." Crowley v. 
Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d 435, 438, (2007). However, Berryhill fails to address 
I Appellant's Reply and Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 10. 
2 Appellant's Reply and Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 17. 
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the trial court's decision on this issue in his Appellant's brief. Rule 35(a)(6), IAR. Apparently 
now realizing this critical error, Berryhill finally argues in his Reply Brief the abuse of discretion 
standard, and then attempts to claim he raised this argument in his first brief. "This mistake 
means the court's decision on JNOV3 and new trial motions was not rendered 'through the outer 
bounds of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards' and 'through an exercise of 
reason,' as required even under the more lenient standard for new trial. (cite omitted) Mosell 
Equities fails to address this flaw in the court's reasoning, although Defendants raised it in 
Appellant's Brief (p. 28).,,4 Upon review of the Appellant's Brief, however, it is clear Berryhill 
never addressed the trial court's decision granting a new trial. Page 28 of Berryhill's Brief 
contains the last portion of Berryhill's jury instruction argument and the beginning of his 
argument the verdict was supported by "substantial, competent evidence," a JNOV standard. 
Berryhill failed to raise any argument related to the trial court's grant of a new trial in his 
first brief and therefore has waived any entitlement for appellate review on this issue. Even if 
the court on appeal were to reverse Judge Goffs decision granting the JNOV, as Berryhill failed 
to raise or argue Judge Goff erred when granting a new trial, Mosell Equities is entitled to a new 
trial. 
II. BERRYHILL ARGUES THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD. 
The jury responded "no" to Special Verdict Question No.1. 
Question No.1: Was there an express contact between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, 
LLC and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached? 
3 The abuse of discretion standard does not apply to the review of an order granting a JNOV. 
4 Appellant's Reply and Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 17. 
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Judge Goff granted Mosell Equities' Motions for JNOV by ruling as a matter of law 
Exhibit 1 was not ambiguous. Whether a contract is ambiguous, as well as the interpretation of 
the unambiguous language, are questions of law; both at the trial level and on appeal, not 
questions of fact. Mcdevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse Inc., 151 Idaho 280,283,255 P.3d 1166, 
1169 (2011). Although Berryhill argues the "clearly erroneous" standard applies on appeal, that 
standard is limited to review of questions of fact, not questions of law. Schroeder v. Partin, _ 
Idaho _,259 P.3d 617, 622, (2011). On appeal of questions oflaw, the appellate court 
exercises free review. Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., 150 Idaho 308,246 P.3d 
961, (2010). Consequently, on this appeal, the appellate court is free to decide whether they 
believe Berryhill had provided a reasonable alternative meaning to the language in Exhibit 1, 
"This is a loan ... ," or to the term "loan" which Glenn Mosell wrote conspicuously on nine of the 
ten checks Berryhill accepted. If the appellate court finds the language unambiguous, it must 
affirm Judge Goffs grant of a JNOV on Count 1. 
Mosell Equities will acknowledge that the "clearly erroneous" standard would apply if as 
Berryhill claims the jury could have found a contract, but then no breach. However, if the jury 
found there was a loan, but no breach ofthe loan agreement, then that finding would be "clearly 
erroneous," as the evidence was uncontested Berryhill denied there was a loan and he refused to 
repay when asked. Berry concedes this issue in his Appellant's Brief at page 30. 
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III. BERRYHILL MISREPRESENTS TO THE APPELLATE COURT THAT MOSELL 
EQUITIES MOVED FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON ITS CONTRACT CLAIM. 
Berryhill misrepresents that Mosell Equities moved for directed verdict on its breach of 
contract claim. On page 27 of his Appellant's Brief, Berryhill cites to a statement by the trial 
court and suggests the trial court was "denying Mosell Equities' motion for directed verdict on 
the breach of contract count, .... ,,5 Judge Goff was actually responding to Berryhill's motion for 
directed verdict raised after Mosell Equities had rested. Berryhill argued there was no contract 
as a matter oflaw, to which Judge Goff was responding. Berryhill apparently is now arguing 
that Judge Goff heard and considered Mosell Equities' motion for directed verdict on its contract 
claim, which Berryhill claims Mosell Equities then again raised in its Motion for JNOV. 
However, the record clearly proves otherwise.6 (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 536, L. 19 to p. 549, L. 6.) 
IV. MOSELL EQUITIES DID NOT INVITE ANY ERROR. 
Berryhill's argument is premised on the erroneous contention that failure to object to a 
jury instruction ipso Jacto constitutes invited error. Such a contention ignores the very definition 
of "invited error." 
As the Idaho Supreme Court stated recently in Taylor v. Nichols, Docket No. 36130, 
(2010), "'Invited error' is '[a]n error that a party cannot complain of on appeal because the 
party, through conduct, encouraged or prompted the trial court to make the erroneous ruling.' 
Black's Law Dictionary 249 (3rd pocket ed. 2006)." Based on this definition, it is hard to 
5 Appellant's Brief, p. 27, citing to the Tr., Vol. I, p. 556, Ll. 7-13.) 
6 Mosell Equities did move for directed verdict on Berryhill's fraud counterclaim, but not on its own breach of 
contract claim. 
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imagine a party can invite error when that party is following a court's prior ruling when 
submitting jury instructions. 
Judge Williamson denied Mosell Equities' Motion for Summary Judgment through which 
Mosell Equities sought a ruling as a matter of law Exhibit 1 was unambiguous. Consequently, 
because of that ruling, Mosell Equities drafted and offered jury instructions commensurate with 
Judge Williamson's ruling, as Berryhill acknowledges in his brief. 
MoseH Equities continues to argue that Exhibit 1 is umm1biguous, despite rulings 
by both the district court and the trial court to the contrary and despite its own 
failure to object to jury instructions in line with those rulings. (Appellant'S Reply 
and Cross-Respondent's Brief~ p. 5.) (Emphasis added.) 
Having moved for summary judgment, MoseH Equities did not "prompt" or "encourage" 
any error; it specifically argued during its summary judgment motion it was error not to conclude 
Exhibit 1 was unambiguous. However, having lost that argument, MoseH Equities was forced to 
file jury instructions which embodied the Judge Williamson's prior ruling. Under these 
circumstances, Mosell Equities' conduct hardly met the definition of invited error. 
V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE IRRELEVANT TO A MOTION FOR JNOV. 
In his two briefs, Berryhill argues jury instruction issues (ad nauseam), when jury 
instructions are irrelevant to a JNOV motion. 
When ruling on a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a court must determine 
whether, as a matter of law, the jury's verdict was supported by evidence of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have reached 
a similar conclusion to that of the jury. Hudson, 118 Idaho at 478, 797 P.2d at 
1326 (citation omitted). This inquiry focuses the court's attention to the evidence 
admitted in the case, and the court reviews the facts with deference to the 
nonmoving party. Ricketts, 137 Idaho at 580,51 P.3d at 394. 
Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776, 203 P.3d 702, 706 (2009). (Emphasis added) 
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If the facts establish the contract at issue was unambiguous, then a court must rule as a 
matter of law a contract existed, just as Judge Goff ruled. As this analysis has nothing to do with 
how the jury was instructed, whether there was error in such instructions is irrelevant. 
Berryhill's reliance on the Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P.3d 702, (2009), is 
misplaced. Unlike this case, where Mosell Equities argued the evidence in support of its motion 
for JNOV, the Appellants in Bates argued error in the jury instructions "as a matter oflaw." 
In the instant case, Appellants do not argue that the jury's verdict was not 
supported by evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable 
minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury. Rather, 
Appellants argue that the special verdict jury instructions were incorrect as a 
matter of law. 
Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho at 776. 
The sole reason the Supreme Court was discussing jury instructions in the context of a 
motion for JNOV in Bates was because the Appellant raised that issue, which the Court 
ultimately ruled was error. Bates does not however support Berryhill's contention jury 
instructions are relevant when considering motions for JNOV. 
VI. EXHIBIT 1 WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS. 
Berryhill appears to claim that somehow Mosell Equities was equivocal in its contention 
there was always loan. However, in its Complaint, (R., Vol. 1, p. 14.), and its Amended 
Complaint, (R., Vol. 1, p. 94.), and throughout the proceedings, Mosell Equities maintained the 
agreement was the funds would remain a loan until the transition to the buy-in occurred. 
While Berryhill may cite to the correct law; "A contract term is ambiguous where there 
are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical," Potlatch Educ. v. 
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Potlatch School Dist., 148 Idaho 630, 663226 P.3d 1277, (2010), once again he fails to provide a 
reasonable alternative interpretation of the contract where "loan" does not mean "loan." Neither 
during the trial nor at any time during this appeal has Berryhill provided any reasonable 
alternative interpretation for the term "loan," which he wrote on Exhibit 1 and which Glenn 
Mosell wrote on nine checks that Berryhill received and accepted. 
Berryhill contends that Glenn Mosell's statements, taken out of context, somehow meant 
Mr. Mosell did not intend the funds to remain a loan pending the buy in. Notably, Berryhill 
claims Mosell's statement, the loaned funds were an "interim substitute," is somehow an 
admission the funds were not a loan. However, this designation indicates Mosell understood the 
loaned fund were distinct from funds that would apply to the as yet undetermined "buy-in." The 
loaned funds were an interim substitution, alkla "loan" until the parties agreed on the terms to 
consummate Mosell Equities' purchase of half of Berryhill & Co., Inc. Mosell' s use of the term 
"interim substitute" is consistent with his contention throughout this litigation that the funds 
were and remained a loan pending the buy in, which again, no one contends ever occurred. 
Moreover, such evidence is irrelevant ifthe court on appeal finds, as did Judge Goff, that 
the language, "This is a loan ... " in Exhibit 1 and the term "loan" on nine of 1 0 checks delivered 
to Berryhill was not ambiguous. 
VII. BERRYHILL HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH FACTS TO SUPPORT AN 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE ON REMAND. 
Berryhill fails to establish any evidence in the record that would support his equitable 
estoppel defense. 
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As the jury was instructed, the first element of the defense of equitable estoppel is proof 
of a false statement of concealment of a material fact. (Instruction No. 20, (R., p. 1267.)) 
Berryhill argues Glenn Mosell somehow misrepresented his intent that the funds would 
remain as a loan until such time as he and Berryhill reached an agreement on the terms of the 
"buy in." "Defendant Berryhill & Company contended throughout the litigation that by insisting 
on calling the funds a "loan," while simultaneously assuring Defendant they would not remain 
such, Plaintiff's principle, Glenn Mosell induced Defendant to accept the funds under false 
pretenses and should be estopped from enforcing any loan contract.,,7 However, once again, 
Berryhill fails to identify facts to support this contention Glenn Mosell's statements were in any 
manner false. 
Berryhill's argument ignores the fact that Mosell Equities transferred money to Berryhill 
& Co. based on Berryhill's promise of Mosell Equities' entitlement to "buy in" to his company. 
Obviously, if Mosell "assured" Berryhill the funds would not remain a loan, it was based on 
Berryhill's promise to deliver the promised equity ownership. In other words, it is Berryhill who 
controls the status of the funds. If Berryhill performs as promised, Mosell Equities gets its 
ownership interest, just as envisioned in the Meier documents. If not, the funds remain a loan, 
just as Berryhill accounted for the funds on his company's financial statements. 
If the parties pursued the buy in and consummated the deal when Berryhill transferred the 
promised equity in his company, then clearly the loaned funds "would not remain such." 
However, Berryhill never tendered any signed "buy in" documents, nor was he able to identify 
7 Appellant's Reply and Cross-Respondents' Brief, p. 25. 
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any final terms at trial. While undoubtedly the parties contemplated future agreement, it was 
clear that if that agreement was never reached, the funds would remain a loan to Berryhill & Co. 
No reasonable person, considering the facts of this case, could have concluded otherwise. 
As Berryhill has failed to establish facts that would constitute a false statement, and if the 
appellate court upholds Judge Goff's decision granting a INOV on Count 1, there is no reason 
for a new trial. 
VIII. MOSELL EQUITIES IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION. 
Mosell Equities delivered $405,000.00 to Berryhill based on Berryhill's promise he was 
selling equity in his restaurant business. With this money, Berryhill has created three operating 
restaurants. If on appeal the reviewing court could somehow conclude the jury answered 
Question No.1, "no" because they believed there was no meeting of the minds, then on what 
equitable basis is Berryhill entitled to just keep $405,000.00? While the money may not be in an 
account as Berryhill contends, it is available as profits from Berryhill's three restaurants. 
If on appeal the reviewing court concludes the jury could have decided there was no 
meeting of the minds as a basis for responding to Question No.1, then Mosell Equities 
respectfully requests remand with instructions for the district court to order the contract 
rescinded and order Berryhill & Co. to remit $405,000.00 to Mosell Equities. 
CONCLUSION 
There was a loan that the parties intended to transfer to equity if they could reach terms. 
However, as Berryhill refused to sign the buy-in documents, the funds Mosell Equities provided 
were and remained as a loan to Berryhill & Co. 
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There was undoubtedly a breach as Berryhill refused to repay the loaned funds after he 
refused to sign the buy-in documents, as Berryhill concedes on appeal. 
As there was a loan contract and a breach, Mosell Equities respectfully requests the Court 
affirm Judge Goffs decision granting JNOV and remand with direction the District Court enter 
Judgment against Berryhill & Co. for $405,000.00. There is no need for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of May, 2012. 
~c~6;k 
For the Respondent-Cross Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of May, 2012, I served the foregoing, by 
having two true and complete copies delivered via the manner indicated to: 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Hand Delivered 
ERIC R. CLARK 
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